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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} Any online service provider ("OSP"), including a website operator, that accepts user postings or includes
content from other parties on its website or online service is at risk that it will be held liable if such third-party
content infringes the copyright of another party. Liability for copyright infringement is an expensive
proposition and can run into the millions of dollars. Thus, an OSP must be vigilant in limiting its potential
liability in connection with such third-party content.
{2} Recognizing that limiting the potential copyright liability of OSPs for third-party content is essential to
the continued flourishing of the Internet, Congress, in 1998, enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") to address this and other issues.[1] Title II of the DMCA creates four new limitations on liability
for copyright infringement by websites and other OSPs, which are, in effect, safe harbors for specified OSP
activities.[2] Each limitation entails a complete bar on monetary damages for direct, contributory, and
vicarious infringement, and restricts the availability of injunctive relief in various ways.[3] If an OSP activity
falls outside of these safe harbors, then the traditional copyright analysis will determine whether the activity
in fact constitutes infringement and whether the OSP has recourse to any of the defenses that are available to
copyright defendants generally, such as fair use or innocent infringement. [4]
{3} Section A of this article describes in greater detail how an OSP qualifies for the safe harbor protections of
the DMCA. Section B and the attached chart then provides a step-by-step guide for removing infringing
material from an OSP's system consistent with these safe harbor protections. Finally, Section C summarizes
current case law involving copyright infringement claims against OSPs.
A. Qualifications for Safe Harbor Protection
{4} The first safe harbor provision applies to an OSP's storing of material on its system at the request of a user
(such as material posted on a message board, in a chat room, or on a user's personal webpage).[5] The second
safe harbor provision covers circumstances where an OSP refers users to material at other online locations, for
example, by means of a search engine or a hyperlink. [6] The third safe harbor provision applies to an OSP
that is temporarily storing on its servers (or "caching") online materials from other websites. [7] The fourth
safe harbor provision covers cases where an OSP provides conduit service to users, such as delivering e-mail
between parties, without content modification. [8]
{5} To qualify for any of these four safe harbors, an OSP must, as a threshold matter: (1) adopt, reasonably
implement, and inform its users and account holders of a policy that provides for the termination from the
system or network of "repeat infringers;" and (2) configure its system or network to accommodate, without
interference, standard copyright protection technologies used to protect copyrighted works.[9] The OSPs that
satisfy these threshold requirements may then be entitled to each separate safe harbor protection under the
circumstances discussed below.[10]
1. Safe Harbors for Storing or Linking to Infringing Material
{6} As noted above, the DMCA establishes one safe harbor for the storing of infringing material at the
direction of a user, and a second safe harbor for referring or linking users to a site containing infringing
materials. An OSP will be entitled to the protection of either of these safe harbors under the following
circumstances:[11]
(a) The OSP must lack actual knowledge of the material's infringing nature and cannot be aware of "facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent." [12] Upon gaining "knowledge or awareness" of
infringement, the OSP must act expeditiously to remove or block access to such material;[13]
(b) The OSP must not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity" in cases
where the OSP "has the right and ability to control that activity;" [14] and
(c) The OSP must comply with the notice and take-down provisions described in Section B of this article
when removing or blocking infringing material. [15]
2. Safe Harbor for System Caching
{7} The DMCA establishes a third safe harbor to limit an OSP's liability for system caching.[16] Caching
refers to a process whereby an OSP makes a temporary copy of popular online material requested by a user so
that the OSP can deliver that copy to subsequent users more quickly and efficiently. [17] AOL, @Home, and
other major OSPs, for example, perform caching functions. An OSP will qualify for the caching safe harbor
under following circumstances: [18]
(a) The OSP's storage of the cached material must be made through an "automatic technical process" for the
purpose of providing the material to subsequent users who request the material; [19]
(b) The OSP must transmit the cached material to subsequent users without modifying its content; [20]
(c) The OSP must comply with rules about updating the cached material "when specified by the person
making the material available online in accordance with a generally accepted industry standard data
communications protocol;"[21]
(d) The OSP must not interfere with technology that returns "hit" information to the person who posted the
material, where such technology meets certain requirements; [22]
(e) The OSP must limit users' access to the material in accordance with conditions on access imposed by the
person who posted the material (e.g., password protection);[23]
(f) The OSP must remove or block any material that has been posted without a copyright owner's
authorization after the OSP has been notified that the material has been removed or blocked at the originating
site; [24] and
(g) The OSP must comply with the notice and take-down provisions described in Section B of this article
when removing or blocking infringing material. [25]
3. Safe Harbor for Conduit Service
{8} The fourth safe harbor applies to the transmission, routing, and transient storage or copying of
information, such as e-mail, as it moves from one point on a network to another at someone else's request.
[26] Essentially, this safe harbor applies to OSPs whose role in the intermediate transmission or storage of
copyrighted materials is merely as a passive conduit of the material. An OSP will qualify for the conduit safe
harbor under the following circumstances.[27]
(a) The transmission of the material must be initiated by a person other than the OSP;[28]
(b) The transmission, routing, and storage of the material must be carried out by an "automatic technical
process without selection of the material by the [OSP];"[29]
(c) The OSP must not determine the recipients of the material; [30]
(d) The OSP must not make any copy of the material ordinarily accessible to anyone other than the intended
recipients, and must not keep any copy for longer than reasonably necessary for the OSP's transmission,
routing, or connection; [31]and
(e) The OSP must transmit the material without modifying its content.[32]
B. Step-by-Step Guidelines for Removing Infringing Material in Order to Limit Liability under the DMCA
{9} This section describes the specific steps an OSP should take in order to benefit from the first three safe
harbor provisions of the DMCA described above.
[33] There are four steps in this proposed procedure, and each is outlined below.
{10} 1. Step #1: Designating an Agent. As a preliminary matter, an OSP must designate a person who will
receive notifications of alleged copyright infringement. [34] The OSP must: (a) file the name and address of
its designated agent and certain other particulars with the Copyright Office; (b) pay a $20 fee to the Copyright
Office; and (c) post the name and other contact information of the designated agent on its online service.
{11} 2. Step #2: Notification of Infringement. The DMCA requires that an infringement notification sent by
a copyright owner (or the owner's authorized agent) to an OSP substantially comply [35] with six elements to
be considered effective under the DMCA. Specifically, the notification must:
(a) include an electronic or physical signature of the person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the
copyright interest; [36]
(b) contain a description of the copyrighted work that is alleged to have been infringed, including the
electronic location, such as the URL (i.e., the webpage address), where the copyrighted work exists, or a copy
of the copyrighted work; [37]
(c) identify the URL web address or other specific location where the allegedly infringing material is located;
[38]
(d) provide the address, telephone number, and e-mail address of the notifying party; [39]
(e) include "a statement by the notifying party that it has a good faith belief that the" disputed use "is not
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law;"
[40] and
(f) must contain a statement by the notifying party, made under penalty of perjury, that the information in the
notice is accurate and that the notifying party is the copyright owner or the owner's authorized agent. [41]
{12} Because the statute creates some ambiguity as to when the notice requirements might be satisfied or
when an OSP is deemed to have knowledge of the infringing material, an OSP should inform users about
these six elements, for example, through a link on its website. Posting the notice requirements will help
facilitate an OSP's efforts to remove infringing material as quickly as possible. The OSP should also establish
a process to seek information from copyright owners or their authorized agents if some, but not all, of the
notification requirements are satisfied. [42]
{13} 3. Step #3: "Take Down" Procedures. Once the OSP receives sufficient notification of a copyright
infringement under Step #2 above, or otherwise becomes aware of the infringing material, it must
"expeditiously" take down or block access to the material. [43] Under the DMCA, an OSP that in good faith
removes or blocks access to allegedly infringing material is exempt from any liability for such removal or
blocking. [44]
{14} 4. Step #4: Notice and Putback. After the OSP removes or blocks material stored on its system under
Step #3, it must then take the additional actions outlined below. First and foremost, the OSP's designated
agent must take reasonable steps to promptly notify the user who posted the allegedly infringing material that
the OSP has removed or blocked such material. [45] Second, the user may then send a "counter-notification"
to the OSP's designated agent, stating that the removal or blocking was the result of a mistake or a
misidentification of the material. [46] The counter-notification must be in writing and must substantially
comply with certain formal requirements. [47] Third, if the counter-notification substantially complies with
the statutory requirements, then to remain exempt from liability for the "take down," the OSP must: (a)
promptly provide a copy of the counter-notification to the copyright owner (or authorized agent) who sent the
original infringement notification under Step #2 above; and (b) inform that person that the OSP will restore
the removed material in ten to fourteen business days of receiving the counter-notification. [48] Finally, unless
such copyright owner (or authorized agent) then notifies the OSP that he or she has filed a court action
seeking to restrain the alleged infringement, the OSP must replace or unblock the material within ten to
fourteen business days of receiving the counter-notification. [49]
{15} If an OSP follows the step-by-step process set forth above, it will receive the benefits of the first three
safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, thereby avoiding potentially significant liability for copyright
infringement. To further assist OSPs in qualifying for these safe harbor protections, attached as Appendix A is
a chart which may be used to track the OSP's compliance with the various steps; attached as Appendix B is a
sample form published by the Copyright Office for designating an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement; and attached as Appendix C is a sample copyright agent information page to be posted on the
OSP's website.
C. Case Law on Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement
{16} This Section provides an overview of how courts have generally treated infringement claims against
OSPs. It is important to note, however, that no cases have yet been decided under Title II of the DMCA. The
existing case law will, therefore, apply if an OSP's activities fall outside the limitations on liability specified
in the DMCA. The case law may also be helpful in suggesting how a court might construe various
requirements under the DMCA. For example, existing authority can be used to demonstrate how a court might
determine if an OSP has received direct financial benefit under the first two safe harbors discussed in Section
A of this article.
{17} Courts have generally identified three types of copyright infringement that might apply to an OSP: (a)
direct infringement; (b) contributory infringement; and (c) vicarious infringement. [50] The cases described
below generally involve traditional OSPs, such as AOL or CompuServe, and electronic bulletin board services
("BBS"), which are akin to the message board services offered on many websites today.
1. Direct Infringement
{18} Direct copyright infringement consists of the unauthorized exercise of one of the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder provided in Section 106 of the Copyright Act, including, among other things, the exclusive
right to: (a) reproduce a copyrighted work; (b) distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership; and (c) display the copyrighted work publicly. [51] Direct infringement does
not require intent or any particular state of mind, although willfulness is relevant to the award of statutory
damages. [52] Consequently, courts have generally viewed the statute as imposing strict liability on violators.
{19} To sustain a case of direct copyright infringement, the plaintiff must first satisfy two threshold
requirements. The plaintiff must first prove ownership of a valid copyright, and second, the copying by the
defendant of constituent elements of the work that are original. [53] To prove the copying element, the
plaintiff may either produce direct evidence that defendant copied the plaintiff's material, or create an
inference that copying occurred by showing that the defendant had access to the protected work, and the two
works are substantially similar. [54] Once the plaintiff has satisfied these threshold requirements, "the plaintiff
can then establish direct infringement by proving the defendant used the alleged copies in ways described
[under Section 106]." [55]
{20} Federal courts are divided on how to apply this strict liability standard to the Internet context,
particularly where OSPs or BBSs merely act as passive conduits for information, including copyrighted
information, posted by their subscribers. Some courts have chosen to apply the standard rigidly, finding
liability where the service provider has done no more than supply a platform for subscribers to post
information. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, for example, the district court held that the BBS violated
Playboy's exclusive rights to display and to distribute its photographs when subscribers posted copyrighted
photographs on the service. [56] The court concluded that "it does not matter that [the defendant] claims he
did not make the copies itself." [57]
{21} Most other courts, however, have read a volitional element into the strict liability standard. In Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom, the court declined to find a BBS liable for direct infringement based simply, as
a subsequent court noted, "on the creation of a space where infringing activity (i.e., the posting of Scientology
materials) occurred." [58] The Netcom court analogized the service to a "copying machine" that
"automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through [its system]." [59] So long as
the service "did not take an affirmative action that directly resulted in copying plaintiff's works other than
installing and maintaining a system" for subscribers' postings, there is no infringement. [60] Other courts have
adopted the Netcom approach. [61]
2. Contributory Infringement
{22} Even if the OSP or BBS is not found liable for direct copyright infringement, it may nonetheless be held
secondarily liable under a claim of contributory or vicarious infringement. While not provided for in the
Copyright Act, courts have recognized both types of infringement and established standards for reviewing
such claims through case law. Contributory copyright infringement will be discussed in this section, vicarious
infringement in the next.
{23} Contributory infringement imposes liability where one person knowingly "induces, causes, or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another,"
[62] and its participation in the infringing activity is substantial. [63] A plaintiff may prove the knowledge
element if it can show that the defendant knew or should have known of the infringement after receiving
notice from the plaintiff. [64]
{24} Many of the contributory infringement cases in the Internet context have involved Sega, the
manufacturer of computer video games. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, for example, a federal district
court enjoined a BBS from allowing users to post and to exchange copyrighted SEGA video games. [65] The
defendant in MAPHIA had directed and encouraged users to upload and to download Sega games. [66] Sega
has won or settled other cases involving the pirating of its games. [67] In another case that was eventually
settled, CompuServe, a major OSP, was sued for contributory infringement because it did not stop users from
posting and exchanging copyrighted musical works on its service. [68]
3. Vicarious Infringement
{25} In Netcom the court determined that "[a] defendant is liable for vicarious liability for the actions of a
primary infringer where the defendant (a) has the right and ability to control the infringer's acts and (b)
receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." [69] Furthermore, the court went on to state that "
[u]nlike contributory infringement, knowledge is not an element of vicarious liability." [70] Courts have held
that third parties, such as a department stores and swap meet owners, may be liable for the infringing
activities of independent vendors on their premises. [71]
{26} To satisfy the "control" element of a vicarious infringement claim, a plaintiff may show that the
defendant, for example, imposed certain rules and regulations on the primary infringer; [72] possessed a right
to terminate the infringer's activities; [73] controlled the access customers had to the activities of the
infringer;
[74] and/or generally promoted the commercial activities on its premises. [75] Courts have been more divided
on what constitutes "direct financial benefit" for purposes of satisfying the second element of vicarious
infringement. Some courts have required that the financial benefit be tied directly to the infringing activity,
such as commissions from the sale of infringing materials. [76] Hence, under this approach, fixed fee
payments for space or services that are unrelated to the nature of the infringing activity, such as fixed monthly
rental payments, will be insufficient to establish direct financial benefit. Other courts, however, have
established a much lower threshold. In these cases, defendants that charged fixed rental fees were nonetheless
found liable because the infringing activity led to higher revenues for the defendants. [77]
{27} At least three Internet-related cases address claims of vicarious infringement. In two of those cases, the
courts found inadequate evidence to satisfy the "direct financial benefit" element. [78] In Netcom, for
example, the court said that the generalized benefits that flowed from the BBS's lax oversight of posted
materials (i.e., allegedly attracting more infringers/subscribers to its service) did not establish a direct
financial benefit. [79] Likewise, in Mairobie-FL v. NAFED, the court held that the monthly fixed payments
made by the primary infringer to the defendant to host its website also failed to satisfy the requirement,
particularly since the payments were unrelated to the number of visits to the infringing site. [80]
{28} However, in a third case, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., a federal district court did find
the defendants directly and vicariously liable for the posting of copyrighted Playboy images on their website.
[81] The defendants operated a website that offered subscribers, for a flat monthly fee, access to pornographic
images and photographs that the defendants had obtained from selected adult-oriented Internet newsgroups.
[82] As to the claim of vicarious liability, the court concluded that two of the defendants -- the owner and the
manager of the site --- had the right and ability to exercise control over the infringing activity given their
respective positions in the company, and that the two defendants also received direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity because they each collected a percentage of the net profits from the site. [83]
 
II. CONCLUSION
{29} Title II of the DMCA has received mixed reviews in the legal community. Some have lauded the
measure as a reasonable compromise between OSPs and copyright holders. [84] According to this view, the
Act will help promote Internet use and e-commerce by relieving OSPs from the significant costs associated
with policing their websites for infringing material, while at the same time encouraging OSPs and copyright
holders to work cooperatively to limit such infringing activity. [85] Others, however, have contended that the
DMCA gives an unfair and unnecessary advantage to OSPs in copyright disputes. [86] Under this view, the
Act merely shifts the costs of monitoring websites for infringing materials from OSPs to copyright holders,
and places OSPs at a competitive advantage over non-OSPs, which do not enjoy the safe harbor protections of
the DMCA. [87]
{30} In fact, there are already efforts under way to address legislatively another perceived failing of the Act.
As noted above, an OSP will be entitled to the protection of the safe harbors for storing or linking to
infringing material if the OSP lacks actual knowledge of the material's infringing nature and is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. Consequently, eBay, the leading web-based
auction service, claims that this provision discourages OSPs from monitoring the content posted to their sites
for fear of violating this knowledge-based standard and inviting an infringement suit, and has proposed
amending the DMCA expressly to immunize OSPs that choose to monitor content if they miss an item that
infringes a copyright. [88]
{31} Notwithstanding the ongoing debate about its relative merits and shortcomings, the DMCA is in full
force and effect and will likely remain so for some time. The DMCA is a complex law, but one which confers
special benefits on OSPs that satisfy its safe harbor requirements. Hence, practitioners are well advised to
study and understand its provisions and to implement mechanisms, such as those described above and
depicted in the attached chart, to effectively address copyright infringement notices under the DMCA and
therefore qualify for its safe harbor protections.
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APPENDIX A
 
TRACKING CHART TO QUALIFY FOR FIRST THREE SAFE HARBORS UNDER DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
NOTIFICATION COUNTER-NOTIFICATION
Date OSP Copyright Subscriber/ Description Date OSP Date OSP Date If no notice
receives
notification
of alleged
copyright
infringement
Owner
Contact
Information:
(1) name
(2) e-mail
address
(3) mail
address
(4) phone
number
(5) fax
number
Infringer
Contact
information:
(1) name
(2) e-mail address
(3) mail address
(4) phone number
(5) fax number
of
copyrighted
work,
including
URL
receives
written
counter-
notification
from
subscriber/
infringer
sends copy
of counter-
notification
to
copyright
owner
copyright
owner
advises OSP
suit has been
filed to
restrain
infringement
received from
copyright
owner
regarding
lawsuit, date
OSP puts
back/unblocks
subscriber's
material (must
be within 10-
14 business
days of
receipt of
counter-
notification)
        
 Identification
of electronic
address (such
as the URL)
where
infringing
material is
located
Date
infringing
material is
taken down
or blocked
by OSP
  Date OSP notifies
subscriber/infringer
that material has
been taken down or
blocked
    
1.
2.
3.
 
APPENDIX B
Interim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification
of Claimed Infringement
 
Full Legal Name of Service Provider:
Alternative Name(s) of Service Provider (including all names under which the service provider is
doing business):
Address of Service Provider:
Name of Agent Designed to Receive
Notification of Claimed Infringement:
Full Address of Designated Agent to which Notification Should be Sent (a P.O. Box or similar
designation is not acceptable except where it is the only address that can be used in the
geographic location):
Telephone Number of Designated Agent:
Facsimile Number of Designated Agent:
Email Address of Designated Agent:
Signature of Officer or Representative of the Designating Service Provider:
Date:
Typed or Printed Name and Title:
Note: This Interim Designation Must be Accompanied by a $20 Filing Fee Made Payable to the
Register of Copyrights.
 
APPENDIX C
COPYRIGHT AND COPYRIGHT AGENT INFORMATION
Company respects the intellectual property of others, and we ask you to do the same. Company may, in
appropriate circumstances and in its sole discretion, terminate the Company's service account ("Account") or
access to specific services offered by the Company to users who infringe the intellectual property rights of
others.
If you believe that your work has been copied and is available on the Company's service in a way that
constitutes copyright infringement, please provide Company's Copyright Agent with the following
information: 
an electronic or physical signature of the person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the
copyright interest;
a description of the copyrighted work that you claim has been infringed, including the URL (i.e., the
Web page address) or other electronic address of the location where the copyrighted work exists, or a
copy of the copyrighted work;
identification of the specific location on the Company's service where the material that you claim is
infringing is located;
your address, telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address;
a statement by you that you have a good faith belief that the disputed use is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law; and
a statement by you, made under penalty of perjury, that the above information in your notice is accurate
and that you are the copyright owner or authorized to act on the copyright owner's behalf.
Company's Copyright Agent for notice of claims of copyright infringement on the Company's service is who
can be reached as follows:
By mail:
By phone: (___) ___-____
By facsimile: (___) ___-____
By e-mail: ________________@________.___
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[1]. See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512) [hereinafter "DMCA"].
[2]. The DMCA defines a "service provider," in relevant part, as a "provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities thereof." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1) (West 1999). Such a definition would
appear to encompass OSPs that provide online services, although the precise coverage of the DMCA has yet
to be litigated. See id. The legislative history also states that the definition includes, for example, "providing
Internet access, e-mail, chat room and webpage hosting services." H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 65 (1998).
[3]. See 17 U.S.C.A § 512(a),(b) (West 1999).
[4]. See § 512(l).
[5]. See § 512(c).
[6]. See § 512(d).
[7]. See § 512(b).
[8]. See § 512(a).
[9]. See § 512(i). The DMCA defines such technologies as "technical measures that are used by copyright
owners to identify or protect copyrighted works" and "have been developed pursuant to broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers," "are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, and do not impose substantial burdens on [OSPs]." § 512(i)(2).
[10]. Each safe harbor relates to a separate and distinct function, and a determination of whether an OSP
qualifies for one safe harbor has no effect on a determination of whether it qualifies for any of the other three.
[11]. These safe harbors track, in certain respects, the elements for contributory, vicarious, and direct
copyright infringement under traditional copyright law. See Section C of this article for further discussion. For
example, the first prong of the safe harbor test goes to the OSP's "knowledge" of the infringement -- a critical
element in a claim for contributory infringement -- while the second prong goes to control and financial
benefit -- elements for a claim of vicarious liability. Finally, the third prong goes to actual notice of
infringement. In a claim for direct copyright infringement, a defendant may raise an innocent infringer
defense, under which the defendant may avoid, in certain circumstances, liability for statutory damages for
"infringing acts committed before receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been made."
17 U.S.C.A. § 405(b) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
[12]. § 512(c)(A)(ii). The DMCA provides that an OSP need not monitor its service or affirmatively seek facts
indicating infringing activity in order to claim the protections of these safe harbors, although, as the
legislative history states, an OSP's monitoring of its site will not disqualify it from safe harbor protection
either. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 796, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., at 32 (1998). An OSP's awareness of infringing
activity includes subjective and objective components (i.e., subjective as to whether the OSP was aware of the
facts and circumstances indicating infringement, and objective as to whether the infringing activity would
have been apparent to a reasonable person). See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 56 (1998).
[13]. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(A)(iii) (West 1999). The DMCA immunizes OSPs from any claim based on its
removal or disabling of access to such material under this provision. The immunity is available even if the
material or activity is ultimately determined not to be infringing.
[14]. § 512(c)(B) (West 1999). According to the legislative history, an OSP would not be considered to
receive a "financial benefit" where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users.
Consequently, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments would not constitute receiving a
"financial benefit," nor would receiving fees based on length of the message or by connect time. A "financial
benefit" would arise, however, where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material.
See H.R. Rep. No.105-551, at 56 (1998). The legislative history does not address arrangements where one site
pays an OSP to provide a link to its site, and the linked-to site contains infringing material. The OSP arguably
gains a direct financial benefit from such an arrangement, but it may be difficult to show that the OSP has the
right and ability to control such infringing activity on the linked-to site.
[15]. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(C) (West 1999).
[16]. See § 512(b).
[17]. For example, an OSP may cache news reports for the CNN website that are frequently accessed by OSP
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summary judgment for Sega for copyright infringement by BBS provider); Sega of America v. The Ghetto,
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[70]. Id.
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provides greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may
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During congressional hearings on the DMCA, several witnesses representing the interests of copyright
holders complained that the pending legislation would force copyright holders, rather than OSP's, to police
websites for infringing material. See also WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online
Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (statements of
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for infringing material" and that "[c]ourts should not conclude that the service provider loses eligibility for
limitations on liability [under the DMCA] solely because it engaged in a monitoring program." H.R. Rep. No.
105-551 at 73. On the other hand, the statutory language does not provide clear guidance on when such a
monitoring program might implicate the knowledge-based standard.
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